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Abstract
One of the successful stories of regional economic communities (RECs) today is that of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Founded in 1975, it is a 
conglomeration of states having similar but distinctively different colonial experiences in 
West Africa; the Anglophone, the Francophone and the Lexiphone. Contemporary political 
events in the world had made ECOWAS flexible and receptive to reforms. Although there was 
little internal wrangling within the ECOWAS member states, because of the transformation 
and expansion of the economic bloc’s re-establishing, its grasps over political, security and 
social events within the sub-region after the cold war, the development brought division in 
ECOWAS, and expressed such in the form of Anglophone and Francophone dichotomy, for 
reason of not agreeing to military intervention. The ECOWAS shift from non-interference 
principles to military intervention was noticeable when ECOMOG intervened in Liberia’s 
1990 internal conflict; thereby changing her non-interference posture to that of collective 
security action as an alternative in the sub-region. This paper attempted to establish 
the shift in ECOWAS security paradigm, leading to a division within ECOWAS member 
states along ‘linguistic lines’ and how this division affected ECOWAS in the post-Liberian 
intervention. Additionally, it x-rayed the nature, manifestation and consequences of such 
dichotomy. The paper recommended a policy option for ECOWAS to guard against future 
distractions among the member states in order not to divert ECOWAS from achieving her 
goals of economic integration.





Since after independence, states have been involved in regional integration as a strategy 
for solving developmental related challenges in Africa. This is for reasons of the accrued 
benefits of “regional integration” that have been identified as a pivotal factor in the promotion 
of economic development. This was among the reasons a number of regional integration 
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arrangements has been established in the last four decades to ‘promote regional cooperation 
accompanied by continental development (Friday, 2016).
 
The economic community of West African States, ECOWAS, is one of these examples of 
regional economic communities (REC’s) in the world. It was founded in 1975, with the 
sole objective of economic integration within the member states of ECOWAS, and a drive 
towards an improved economy and enhanced livelihood of the people (Oja, 1980). The 
West African sub-region, has an abundance of various raw materials, both minerals and 
natural resources. In addition, the human capital found within that West African sub–region 
is economically productive and is engaged in farming, fishing, animal rearing and other 
agricultural activities. 
The language barrier that exists within this is enormous. One of the legacies the  colonial 
masters banqueted to the people of these regions is the existence of the dominant colonial 
master language and partly culture. Broadly and language wise, the West African states 
have three broad colonially-oriented lingua-franca; the Anglophone, the Francophone and 
the Lusophone. These divisions come out glaringly because of the colonial dominance that 
existed during colonialism and to some extent that exists within neo-colonialism, either as a 
hangover effect of colonialism or because of the present-day neo-colonialism as it unfolds 
now and then, with–in the relationships of the erstwhile colonies, and the colonial mentors.
This has long-term policy effects or rather consequences on the states of Africa that, at a 
point in time, had been colonised and is still left with the experience. Only the states of 
Liberia and, to some extent, Ethiopia, were never colonised in Africa. The indirect rule 
system of the British and the French policy of assimilation as it existed then, during the 
colonial master’s dominance in their spheres of influence has succeeded in orienting the 
citizens according to how they were administered during the colonial days. 
In ECOWAS West Africa, for example, the existence of these viable regional groups, came 
at the time when the cold war was still in place, and the global political equation was 
of bipolarism and the balance of power antics also characterised the politics between and 
among the states in the international system. ECOWAS came as a single economic bloc, 
bringing the Anglophone, the Francophone and the Lusophone states into one single ‘union’, 
despite the different posture of nationalism and anti-colonial postures, both “Peaceful and 
radical…. how possible is the …for the process of integration to neutralise the burden of 
external inclined links, the action as well as the interest–laden relationships with ex-colonial 
powers” who still are having a visual signal in Africa (George, 1994). 
So many academic papers have been written on the issues of the balkanisation of the 
anglophone-francophone, the division within and the implications for ECOWAS as a group. 
In the literature, little or no work was found on the nature, dimension and consequences of 
such dichotomy between the English and the French–speaking countries in West Africa, 
with respect to the new conflict management approach and under the banner of ECOWAS. 
This paper, therefore, sought to examine the nature of dichotomy, the dimension of the 
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dichotomy and the consequences of the dichotomy in the post-cold war period, and 
attempted an evaluation of its implications for ECOWAS as a group. This analysis is with 
reference to Liberia’s conflict, and the approach to intervention by the ECOWAS as a body 
to virtually bifurcate the  organisation  into two different linguistically– inclined groups. 
Lastly, the paper made recommendations for good policy options for ECOWAS as a bloc, 
so that it does not get distracted on its economic objective. 
Background to the Formation of Ecowas
ECOWAS was created when on 28th May 1975, General Gowon of Nigeria and President 
Eyadema of Togo signed a treaty providing for the setting up of what the Togolese President 
called “an embryo of a West African Economic Community” (John, 2012). Fundamentally, 
ECOWAS, is to ‘promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an 
economic union in West Africa to raise the living standards of its peoples while maintaining 
an enhanced economic stability, at the same time fostering relationships between and among 
member states, so as to contribute to the progress of Africa’s development’(ECOWAS, 
1993).
 
Furthermore, ECOWAS seeks to ensure “the harmonisation and co-ordination of national 
policies and the promotion of integration; the establishment of a common market; and the 
establishment of an economic union, including the creation of a monetary union (Elowson, 
2010), as stipulated via the 1993 revised treaty. Article 3(2) (a) provides that all national 
policies, programmes, and activities in the domain of agriculture, (exploitation of) natural 
resources, industry, transport and communication, energy, trade, money, finance, taxation, 
education, information, culture, science, technology, tourism and legal matters” should be  
harmonized.
Geographically located in Western Africa, south of the Sahara, the ECOWAS community is 
composed of 15 politically sovereign independent states, namely of the “Republic of Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo” (Udoh, 2015).
From the onset, Nigeria’s concern to limit the external influence of the external world in 
the political and economic activities of the sub-region explains her proactive role in making 
sure that ECOWAS succeeds. While “regional integration was still proclaimed as a prime 
objective of the Community, its emergence reflected Nigeria’s pervasive concern with 
stabilising and controlling its external environment” (Daniel, 1983). The Francophone states 
that the sub-region, Ivory Coast and Senegal in particular, see Nigeria as ‘a threat’ against 
the French interest in the region because of “Nigeria’s new political and economic influence 
in West Africa”(Daniel, 1983). He further argued that the creation of the Communaute 
economique de l’Afrique de l’ouest (C.E.A.O.) a French alternative for ECOWAS, was an 
attempt by six francophone countries - the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, 
and Mauritania, with the active support of France to counterbalance.
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The biggest threat to the solidarity of ECOWAS members has been internal and comes 
from the cultural divide between its Francophone and Anglophone members. Francophone 
and Anglophone Africans have had their suspicions about each other’s lifestyles and 
administrative competencies, with the Francophones believing they were more attuned to 
the sophisticated lifestyles of the French (Bamfo, 2013).
Methodology
This qualitative research paper used a thematic form of data presentation and analysis. 
Data was collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews, with 8 questions on 
the schedule. The collected data was coded using NVivo software, version 10, to organise 
the data. The analysis was then made from the inferences and the structure of the data as 
organised by the software. Seven (7) respondents were interviewed; six from the ECOWAS 
headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, and an academic, who is also a scholar on West African 
issues and affairs. A model was developed from the software, and the themes created are 
discussed in the analysis. 
 
Conceptual Framework
The explanation by scholars on the type of Africa’s post-colonial states with their colonizers 
is that of exploitation. The imperial West can go to every length to maintain the exploitative 
relationships between them and their colonies. 
Neo-Colonialism is “the existence of ongoing influence of the former colonial powers” 
(Martin, 1985). It is a brand new “form of domination applied after the colonial period “by 
the former colonisers on their ex-colonies (Crozier, 1964). It is also seen as a new process by 
“imperialist powers with new hidden mechanisms in order to reinforce capitalism maximise 
profit and maintain the economic, political, ideological and military influence of colonial 
times, (Vajrushev, 1974). Putting all these, Haag (2012) argues that:
neo-colonialism is here defined as a retro-alimenting system of domination and 
exploitation installed and preserved by the former colonial ruler in its ex-colony, 
in which economic, financial and military means serve to keep in power favourable 
leaders and impose favourable policies which again secure economic and financial 
benefits.
In the absence of colonialism, neo-colonialism strives through different hidden means and 
processes in West Africa by maintaining social, political and cultural ties with the imperial 
West that colonised them. The francophone ECOWAS states for instance, still maintain 
military ties with France. With this, the loyalty, commitments, dedication and contributions 
of the francophone states, in ECOWAS, will always be questionable, and division is bound 
to occur, to serve the interest of the ‘imperial master’.
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The Model
This model is a pictorial presentation of how the data collected in the interview, was coded, 
organised and presented. The data collected was synchronised with the literature to analyse 
the project and the issues, thematically construed and addressed by this study.
 
Figure 1. The Anglophone – Francophone dichotomy.
The Nature of the Dichotomy
All the states in West Africa except Liberia went through the colonial rule before attaining 
self-independence. The ‘principal colonisers’ were Britain, France and Portugal, thereby 
translating their ‘subject’ along the linguistic barrier of Anglophone, Francophone and 
Lusophone. The institutionalisation by the colonial masters, of these divisions among the 
people of West Africa occurred through the creation of separate political units and divided 
societies. During the 19th century, boundaries were drawn arbitrarily, without recourse to 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural barriers. This picture is captured in the work of Aremu (2010), 
who cited Alabi (2006:57) and Cammack et al. (1988:13): 
the colonization of Africa by European powers in the 19th century created political 
units that divided ethnic groups in some cases and combined rival groups in others. As 
currently composed, boundaries of most Africa states were arbitrarily drawn without 
regard to ethnic and cultural affinities. This reveals that, in Africa, to them colonialism 
succeeded in many cases in dividing the same people across different boundaries. 
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This division in West Africa was revealed, when Nigeria seemed ‘so desperate’ to see the 
conflict in Liberia come to an end. This action was translated to mean that Nigeria, being an 
anglophone state, was having an agenda of hegemonic domination by the francophone states 
within ECOWAS. This perception, however, affected virtually every aspect of the efforts 
to solve the endemic crisis in Liberia; the mediatory role, the diplomatic angle as well as 
the use of the military force which became very difficult to be agreed upon by the member 
states. Howe (1996), captured the scenario that “ECOWAS itself was badly divided mostly 
between English and French speaking states-throughout ECOMOG’s existence. France had 
continued close political and economic links with its former colonies, most of whom feared 
Nigerian dominance of the region” (Howe, 1997:152). This affected the ECOWAS peace 
plan that was forward by the standing mediation committee (SMC). The strategy initially 
was, as put by Ademola (1995), that:
The initial response of Ecowas was to appoint a Standing Mediation Committee - with 
The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo as members, and Guinea and Sierra 
Leone as observers - with a mandate to establish the facts in the Liberian crisis. This 
Committee, on the advice of Nigeria, created the intervention force with troops mainly 
from Nigeria, and smaller units from The Gambia and Ghana, and from Liberia’s 
immediate neighbours, Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Sighting the unprecedented turn on the initial plan, and believing that it was never the 
agreement as planned, and the changes coming because of advice from Nigeria, it heightened 
the fears of the French-speaking states, seeing the SMC making a turn at the original plan. 
The fact that, Nigeria had influenced the SMC to have a change in the outcome, and coming 
with ECOMOG as an option for the ECOWAS peace plan, anxiety set in, and Nigeria’s 
regional interests certainly were in play. This was the perception of the Francophones. 
Lack of trust within the member states in the sub-regional economic bloc, led to the rejection 
of the ECOWAS peace plan by the “two leading Francophone countries in the region” 
(Rasheed & David, 2001) and these states did a lot to frustrate the military intervention via 
ECOMOG in Liberia because the ECOWAS peace plan was interpreted by the Francophone 
states as a “road show,” organised by the Anglophone (Rasheed and David, 2001; Max, 
1996; Dóra, 2008), to perpetuate an agenda of anglophone control of West African states 
as a whole.
The data gathered from the interview respondents on the field, revealed further that the 
division existed because of the long existing politics between Britain and France. This 
politics also manifested itself in their ex-colonies in most parts of the world. The 6th 
respondent1  for instance, remarked that.
I will be very frank with you. You see, the politics that goes on between Britain and 
France whichever way you handle it, you will see that it is affecting us in Africa 
(ECOWAS, September 2016).
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The first respondent‟ also confirmed the existence of the division along linguistic lines, and 
believed that this was something that would continue to linger on within ECOWAS. He was 
confident that these differences were being managed within them.
Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone divide, within ECOWAS is an issue that 
lingered on and perhaps, will continue to linger on for some time, but I can see that they are 
managing, the member states are managing these differences3.
The second respondent explained that the impact of colonialism or rather certain legacies, 
which the colonial masters, bequeathed to their colonies in the region still impeded both 
policy decisions and social relations among member states. However, these influences from 
the colonial masters “should not deter” ECOWAS from her objectives. In his words, he 
posits that;
we know, that this issue of colonisation is what we have been suffering.. when you 
trace back to history even in Nigeria, and the other member states, and we know that 
some of these colonial masters have influence over some of our decisions but we don’t, 
as a body, internationally, we come to agree that, this should not deter the aims and 
objectives of what we want to achieve of what we want to achieve4.
The fact that such colonial masters’ influence exists, and even influences some or most 
of the decisions of ECOWAS, certainly realising the economic integration agenda of the 
institution can hardly be achieved. France for example, had created the French equivalent 
of ECOWAS, the CEAO. France funded the “creation of the Communaute economique de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO)” in 1970, to enlist the francophone states of “Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’lvoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal” as members. This action by France, 
was seen by Nigeria as a neo-colonial economic outfit meant to increase the necessities 
or wants of France by the Francophone West Africa (Emola, 1995) . There are facts from 
the academic literature that France was never comfortable with the growing relevance of 
Nigeria in West Africa. This perhaps might jeopardise their interests, particulary economic 
intrests in West Africa. This did not get down well with France in particular and hence 
looked for possible avenues to contain the growing influence of the Nigerian states. Offu & 
Okechukwu (2015) content that.
Nigeria in the 1990s down to the new millennium was described by the CIA World Fact 
Book as “a regional power’’ with a growing sense of self-assurance and a developing 
capability to demonstrate it. In the three decades since independence…[Nigeria]sought 
and played various roles as regional leader, peacekeeper, mediator, and arbiter.
This is certainly one of the reasons why France was never comfortable with Nigeria. 
Nigeria, for many reasons, took the funding of ECOWAS as a challenge so as to contain the 
influence of France’s interests in the sub-region. These developments, certainly would affect 
not only the relationship between France and Nigeria on the one hand, and Nigeria and the 
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francophones on the other, but also affect the policy decisions of ECOWAS especially on 
any issue that France, would have interest in. This agreement was in line with the opinion 
of the second respondent.
The respondent confirmed also, of the existence of the division in ECOWAS especially 
among the Anglophone and the Francophone member states of ECOWAS, but ECOWAS had 
moved ahead of such divisions already. He notes that sometimes scholars and academicians 
exaggerate the position of things from their perspectives. In his words.
So, it exists, but does not really... we try to move ahead, not look at it, is still scholars 
that say..., I will give you example, maybe you don’t know, I am trying to widen 
your scope, knowledge about how scholars frame things. You know after the crises 
in Liberia, you know it straight to Sierra Leon, Guinea Bissau, as of 2000, there was, 
in Ivory coast, Cote d’lvoire, apart from this recent one happened in 2010, Gbago, 
case, they also had crises, then, when it was ongoing, in 1999 Guinea Bissau, was a 
member of ECOWAS, they gave their notice to withdrew their membership, because 
the treaty says you can withdraw your membership after giving a one year notice. In 
2000, they were allowed to go, they left, scholars, researchers, like you started, then 
no body… the reason for their pulling out was not stated in their meeting, we just see 
a final communique in their membership, but trying to interpret it, to analyse it that 
because of their colour, because of their tribe, they left, that if the minority takes over 
government, ECOMOG will aid them to come into power. Number two, the Arab 
Maghreb, they feel they may benefit more, if they belong to the Arab Maghreb Union. 
But at the end of the day, my own opinion, I think they were right, they wanted to 
come back, don’t know better why they wanted to live, I think they wanted to belong 
to Arab Maghreb Union. My thinking then, it’s all about politics, I am privileged to 
travel to some member states, when Libya was buoyant, trying to spoil member state 
with, some countries with their money, if you go to Niger, you will see Hotel Libya, 
is their investment, you go to Mali, if you go to Burkina Faso, some of these places, 
so, I am not talking as an ECOWAS staff now, I am talking as a research person with 
you, we are brain storming, so I am thinking Gaddafi did the same to some of these 
people, and lobbied them, I remember he attended some of our summits and said we 
are toothless bulldog these and that, he was using money to influence some of them, I 
am sure he engineered some of these things and they pulled out, my own thinking, at 
a time they wanted to come back I don’t know what happened, because, I remember 
Ibn Chambas, in one of the meetings, he opens to say that Guinea Bissau said they will 
come back that year5.
He further raised many issues about politics, especially how other external forces permeated 
the member states with inducements, investments and promises. These inducements affected 
what I term as “the degree of loyalty” of member states to the mother body ECOWAS.  I 
included this long quotation as part of the coded response, because it has thrown so much 
light, on the ‘non-commitments’ of some member states to the principles and ideals, which 
ECOWAS stood for, and also reveals the extent of the external influence other states have 
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on some of the member states. Therefore, if things like that could happen, and are still 
happening, states having substantial influence on states within ECOWAS, like France, 
having effective control of her ex-colonies, then many issues pertaining to policy decisions 
are susceptible to be influenced. Some ECOWAS decisions at the community level are 
bound to carry certain elements of external influence, and therefore, bound to be manipulated 
in line with her interest or her foreign policy interests within the West African region.
To the 3rd respondent, the division within the ECOWAS member states because of language 
barriers was not healthy to ECOWAS and the entire West African community. Allowing this 
division to continue to exist, there was no way how ECOWAS would be able to achieve her 
stated goals of regional economic integration with a ‘divided house’. He noted that, though 
disagreements were inevitable and there were always “different paradigms” of looking at 
the same issues, such a division was not healthy for ECOWAS. These were his words. 
Yes, it was healthy, because that is what ECOWAS was built on to achieve where it is 
today. There were to be conflicts, there were going to be disagreements, there were going to 
be different paradigms and approaches of looking at the same situation.6
The 4th respondent saw the division within the ECOWAS institution as normal, meaning 
that because, different states with differing cultural and political experiences and exigencies 
were represented in ECOWAS, you must have some differences exhibited in the way things 
are done. Additionally, he opined that the ECOWAS interest should always have been 
the most important issue, which should always occupy a prime of place. He pointed the 
ECOWAS “major formula”, stemming from her treaty was what has always been used 
to develop the conflict prevention framework and consensus. On his submission on the 
division of ECOWAS members’ states, he posits that.
Well, if you talk about division, I think this is normal, because when you have a number 
of states, because interests vary, although now the interest now needs to be located in 
a major formula, which is the formula provided by the ECOWAS treaty from which 
it develops the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework….So the ultimate goal is to 
secure peace and that has been done, that is being done because it is a long process the 
process is still on, we are throwing everything at it to ensure that, at the very end things 
will be fine wherever ECOWAS needed or needed to intervene militarily.7
Adding to that, the goal was to secure peace in Liberia, which had been done, but there are 
a lot of processes still to be done. The issue of the division was sparked by the standing 
mediation committee’s (SMC)’s decision to intervene in Liberia militarily despite the lack 
of a protocol authorizing ECOWAS to do that. But all the problems within are surmountable 
and that ECOWAS is doing all it could to overcome these divisions.
To the 7th respondent, though the division was real, he pointed out that one of the 
consequences of these divisions within the member states on language grounds was that 
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the implementation of “decisions and other administrative actions might suffer. There 
always would be issues whenever there were issues before decisions were reached, and 
implemented. He noted that.
Decisions and other administrative actions might suffer a logical implementation, 
due to the divisions, which has certain elements of heterogeneity. Also, these 
differences can be said to be un avoidable because of the cultural difference that 
is inherent in the nature and character of the states found within the economic 
community8.
Coalesced with the respondents’ views, issues of dichotomy between the anglophone and 
the francophone in the ECOWAS community was glaring. It was an issue which a majority 
of the respondents opined that it must exist for reasons of having different culture, with 
different colonial orientation and behaviour coming together to live as one, and because of 
the external influences of the former colonial masters. 
The Manifestation of the Dichotomy
In ECOWAS, dichotomy between the francophones and the anglophones was manifest 
in many ways, but regarding the Liberian interventions of 990 to 1997, it rekindled the 
traditionally colonial-embedded difference. The kick against ECOMOG as Howe (1996) 
and Max (1996) clearly point out was that they refused to contribute troops to ECOMOG and 
Burkina Faso, and accused the ECOWAS of bad procedural matters and “poor consultations” 
(Max, 1996). These were among the major issues that has made the ECOWAS to get divided 
during the crises. More specifically, May Sessay, posits that, the francophone ECOWAS 
member states were completely “unenthusiastic about the ECOMOG” idea (Max). Togo 
and Mali, were members of the “Standing Mediation Committee”, but refused to contribute 
troops at first, when ECOMOG was deployed to Liberia. Their refusal, despite being part 
of the decision at the SMC meeting, was to stand in solidarity with the resistance from 
Cote d’Ivoire. This decision to contribute troops to ECOMOG, to serve as peace keepers 
to Liberia and to observe a cease fire came as the recommendation or outcome of the SMC 
meeting. With these developments, the francophone states within ECOWAS believed that 
the Liberian conflict had given Nigeria, an opportunity to commence a “Pax-Nigerian” in 
the region. (Max, 1996). This is the belief of most of the francophone states, an idea infused 
in them by France, that Nigeria was having a serious hegemonic drive within the region and 
that Nigeria’s irredentist tendencies should always be curtailed.
From the interviews conducted, there are divergent views and opinion on these. The 6th 
respondent opined that unless the colonial masters that earlier on had colonised the states in 
West Africa were united, it would continue to reflect the relationship of the masters within 
the subjects. This division not only manifested itself when it came to the Liberian conflict, 
it did exist during sporting activities, like football, and other social gatherings. In his words.
Liberia’s Post-1990 Ecomog Incursion: An Assessment of Anglophone – Francophone Dichotomy 
57
you can’t run away from the division, until Britain and France are able to come together, 
then you expect African countries to now come together. Until then, there is going to 
be a division. … You know, that division is also manifesting even in football! Every 
time we go for a gathering or some kind of election or whatever, it is very painful to 
me to, see how much Nigeria spends to sustain this ECOWAS, and yet when it comes 
to elective offices, all the Francophones will gang up, and they completely forget that 
it is Nigeria…. and they do it very easily and oppose us9.
 
Additionally, the respondent however, posited that given the opportunity to lead Nigeria, 
“if I were in charge of running the Nigerian government”, he would “call it quits’’ with 
ECOWAS, because Nigeria in ECOWAS is only serving the interests of the French states 
found within the region.
ECOWAS had handled this division, which got manifested because of the creation of 
ECOMOG and the subsequent intervention in Liberia. France was behind the language and 
so many “policies in their countries”, were still having a greater impact and control on their 
ex-colonies. In his words.
ECOWAS has since moved on beyond that stage of disagreement over the establishment 
of the ECOMOG…. because France, it is behind the language and is also behind a lot 
of policies in their countries, and still have staunch influence over these countries. 
Some of the interests of France naturally will clash with ECOWAS10.
The 2nd respondent, felt, that most of the member states still recognised their erstwhile 
colonial masters, and even took instructions from them. This was more related to the 
francophone states, with whom they still maintained so many agreements ranging from 
defence, economic to educational. He said.
that this issue of colonisation is what we have been suffering when you trace back to 
history even in Nigeria, and the other member states, and we know that some of these 
colonial masters have influence over some of our decisions but we don’t, as a body, 
internationally, we come to agree that, this should not deter the aims and objectives of 
what we want to achieve of what we want to achieve11
To the 3rd respondent, the fact that there was an inherent difference in the culture of the 
people belonging to the ECOWAS community, certainly there must be misunderstanding 
that may arise from certain prejudices. The professional training and skills, orientations 
of “military doctrine” and so many things were different for the anglophones and the 
francophones. He puts it this way.
the military training is different, the military orientation is different, most of our 
Anglophone officers or soldiers were trained by the British. Now you have the 
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French approach, the French strategy, the French military doctrine, so, those 
things we are going to, is three-strange bed fellows coming together, there will 
be issues, but over time ECOWAS has learn to, you know, have harmony, you 
know, to create a harmony on these things. But, the central thrust of my own 
point is that, those things were necessary to achieve the ECOWAS we have 
today12. 
The 4th respondent, remarked that, for the fact that ECOWAS constituted member states 
with diverse cultural and language characteristics, differences would always be there. The 
most important thing was to always look at how we could move forward, since ECOWAS 
was able to move ahead of the difference, at whatever level. He submits that:
Now, well, there were differences, but I don’t think we should dwell on the 
differences, we should now dwell on the fact that at the end, there is a resolution 
of those differences… language and culture differences are differences and 
they would remain differences, whether at the interpersonal level or at a more 
corporate community or governmental level13.
Additionally, he added that “the good thing about the international system”, was that 
international relations had its own rules on ‘bilateral and multilateral relations within state 
actors and the like; these rules should be made to govern relationships. These rules help 
to tackle tensions, whenever there are issues to do with such differences.  This framework 
exists among the actors. He said that.
But the good thing about the international system, is that, over the years, key actors 
and key players have seen the need to put in place a set of rules to guide bilateral, 
multilateral relationships among member states, among states, now, so, this framework, 
there are many of them that govern relationships, what they try to do is to reduce or 
remove tensions that might have arise from the differences in religion, in language or 
in tradition14.
Lastly, he concluded that, while admitting that there were disagreements, “reason prevailed 
and decisions were taken” and the needful was implemented. There was a struggle among 
the member states on “who takes the lead, who should be in charge? “Citing examples that 
such struggles for wanting to always be in control also happens in other regional bodies. 
There should always be problems and challenges, but the ability to surmount these problems 
and challenges collectively makes the institution or organisations functional and relevant. 
His conclusion was:
So, my summary is that, yes, there was some disagreement on that basis but at the 
end of the day, reason prevailed, decision was taken and decision was implemented, 
and we learned lessons from these things. So, what happened in Mali, many, many 
years after, was also about who should take the lead, who should be in charge, that 
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was something that we also need to think about, when things happen, not just here 
but also in other regions. In Africa for instance, there is usually some undercurrent 
of context between the African Union and the regional economic grouping, as to who 
should take the lead? This is another dimension of the crisis, the conflict that we are 
trying to manage…. It will come up as a problem or as a challenge but it is made, it 
is resolved, before there, we now we will now agree that, well ok, you take the lead, 
people will argue for, argue against, at the end of the day you all come to an agreement, 
so and that is the whole purpose of international relations is to find ways, to make 
sure that countries work together, international organisations work together in the best 
interest of the International community, and that is what we saw, and that is what we 
would keep on seeing. There would always be problems, there will be challenges, the 
spirit that drives it makes it different that in spite of these challenges, in spite of these 
problems, we would overcome and go on ahead to deliver what we need to deliver15.
The 5th respondent viewed the issues in this manner. The existence of the anglophone and 
the francophone divides within ECOWAS made it difficult for ECOWAS to achieve its 
objectives. Most member states in ECOWAS did not contribute their quota, towards the 
growth and upliftment of the regional body. That, apart from aligning themselves to other 
smaller sub-regional unions within the West African region, most francophone member 
states was not up to date with their payment of financial dues to ECOWAS.  Additionally, 
they did not contribute better ideas on of how problems should be solved within. He however, 
wanted the politics in ECOWAS to remain, but that should not be allowed to muddle the 
ECOWAS objectives. His remarks were: 
Now the Francophone and the Anglophone, you know, are what is making ECOWAS 
not achieve its objectives, because the division among these two-linguistic sectors, is 
creating so many difficulties that most of the member states are refusing to contribute 
their quota to the growth and development of ECOWAS. As I told you earlier, most of 
them are aligned to certain key smaller unions, and that is why at the end you discover 
that many of them are refusing to pay their annual dues, many of them are no more 
aligned to ECOWAS, many of them do not support ECOWAS in any way, many of 
them do not contribute their,.…they don’t give a better idea as to how problems should 
be solved. So, the politics in ECOWAS should remain, but at the same time, it would 
not disorganise ECOWAS as long as ECOWAS stands by its objectives16.
The West African sub-region has many smaller political unions or groups, which other 
ECOWAS member states belong to. To him, more loyalty would zeal the participation if 
given to these smaller unions by many member states, like the MANO River unions (MRU) 
a small organisation belonging to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. All these are ECOWAS 
member states, but have another body, different from ECOWAS. His argument is that, 
member states should give more attention to this smaller organisation or groupings, and 
not contribute much more ideas on how ECOWAS should be made to move forward. The 
question of loyalty or divided loyalty to ECOEAS is still manifesting in this submission. 
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The ideal, he argues, is for ECOWAS to focus on its ideal objectives of regional economic 
integration; the politics within ECOWAS will not stop ECOWAS from achieving its goals.
I do not see this as being healthy if local politics exists within ECOWAS for obvious reasons; 
member states may have a priority when it comes to certain programmes, to connive and 
constitute a cog in the policy conception; also, when such a policy is conceived, and it is not 
in the interests of the member states in other smaller unions and groups, its implementation 
would be jeopardised. It is therefore not healthy in any way to have such local politics 
within either, based on the language difference or looking at other smaller organisational 
interests, which some other member states are into or align to in these respects.
These situations have really poised a challenge for ECOWAS, to really examine its protocol 
again. There are certain memberships, which ECOWAS should not have allowed her 
member states to hold while in ECOWAS, for it will jeopardise their interest and draw the 
organisation backward. Instead of moving ahead, the organisation will always be faced with 
the challenges of trying to settle issues of divisions, or spending so much time and energy to 
lobby the member states before policies are agreed upon and passed for action. ECOWAS 
should revisit such membership. 
Consequences of the Dichotomy
The presentation of the consequences of this division, emanated after the nature and 
manifestation of the Anglophone-francophone division in ECOWAS West Africa, taking 
into consideration the submissions made by the interviewees and synthesising these 
submissions with the existing literature.
Looking at the crisis that engulfed the state of Liberia in December 1998, and the subsequent 
deployment of the ECOWAS troops to Liberia, and also the many issues of legality and 
otherwise of these actions, the debates and arguments were injurious to ECOWAS. It was 
because the argument and counter arguments were counterproductive looking at the scenario 
on ground, the madness that was going on in Liberia, perpetuated by the rebel groups. 
This was because, there existed an organisation that had the same goals and objectives, but 
could not agree on a solution to the issue, which was bound to affect the entire member 
states negatively. Already, there were the issues of the refugees in Libera, the issues of 
international citizens caught in the mayhem in Liberia, and issues of massive brutal killings 
and destructions of lives and properties. All these were not considered by others, and tended 
to halt the solution that would involve the military intervening in the crises in Liberia, in the 
name of politics the politics between the anglophone and the francophone states in the West 
African economic bloc, ECOWAS.
The issues of legality of intervention by ECOWAS (Bah, 2004) and (Ellis, 1995) have 
provided a clear position on issues of non-interference principles and of the UN and the OAU. 
On institutionalisation of the mechanism for collective security (Abass, 2000) provides an 
interesting argument on the relevance and importance of the machanism. However, the 
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issues of Nigeria’s hegemony and the anglophone control (Howe, 1997); Rasheed and 
David, (2001; Max, 1996); Bah, 2004) and the argument of the lack of mandate (Bah, 
2004) opined, that they were advanced, by particularly the francophone states, to challenge 
the ECOWAS-agreed ECOWAS Peace Plan (EPP) to intervene militarily as recommended 
by the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Bah Sirjoh (2004) in his work titled, 
“ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Constructing a Security Regime in West Africa”, captured 
the situation for intervention and the subsequent action of the francophone. He posits that.
The unprecedented nature of the ECOWAS initiative, however, triggered serious 
diplomatic and political controversy in the sub-region. The political and diplomatic 
acrimony that developed following the ECOWAS initiative divided the region into 
two opposing camps, mostly along linguistic lines. Whilst the intervening countries 
invoked humanitarian reasons amongst others for their intervention, those opposed to 
the action  resorted to legalistic arguments anchored on the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU)17.
Looking at the responses of the respondents on the consequences of the anglophone and the 
francophone dichotomy, which came about because of the ECOWAS action in Liberia, the 
majority of the respondents submit that it is not healthy, and therefore bound to affect the 
ECOWAS as a body and the relationship between member states, taking the language angle. 
The response of the 6th respondent for instance was;
Let me tell you. It is these divisions that have made it almost impossible for 
ECOWAS to achieve her goals18.
The inability of ECOWAS achieving its goals as an economic bloc is because of these 
divisions. The possibilities of ECOWAS achieving its integration goals with such inherent 
historical divisions are very minimal. There is no any organisation that can achieve its 
objectives, with the existence of “in-house fighting”.
…I never saw anything of benefit to Nigeria from ECOWAS, apart from 
the fact that we are the ones sponsoring everything. I think we have been 
sponsoring ECOWAS at a lost. Lost because the Francophone countries have 
contributed very little, very, very little with higher profit than Nigeria which 
has contributed so much with little profit19.
The 6th respondent was so pessimistic about any benefits that Nigeria could derive from 
ECOWAS. To him, Nigeria was only busy sponsoring ECOWAS at its detriment, that 
Nigeria is “sponsoring ECOWAS at a lost” Additionally, he posited that, looking at the 
contribution of the francophone states in ECOWAS, it was very minimal, but with a high 
profit, in comparison with Nigeria’s input into ECOWAS, contributing much and reaping a 
minimal return. The francophone states were many in number in compares to the anglophone 
and the Lusophone states in West Africa. There was constant opposition, resistance and 
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hostile relationship between the French-speaking states and Nigeria, in the name of resisting 
Nigeria’s hegemony in West Africa. 
According to the fourth respondent, in the ECOWAS region, three languages are spoken; 
English, French and Portuguese. They are the official languages of the ECOWAS community. 
These cultural and language plurality will certainly have an impact on the seemingly single 
union, ECOWAS. It will have impacts on the social relationships of the member states. That 
“in ordinary relationship these differences could cause a problem. He said;
we always forget the fact that there are three languages and there are three countries 
that speak the other language, which is Portuguese. So, we know as a matter of fact 
that, in ordinary relationship these differences could cause a problem20.
He added that, while agreeing to the fact that there were some disagreements within the 
ECOWAS member states, which manifest them along the language barrier and on decisions 
taken to address the conflict, they came and went. We have seen that at the end of the day, 
“reason prevailed” on what was agreed upon, was implemented, and everybody had learnt 
their lessons. Also, many years after the Liberian crisis, the question of who “takes the 
lead”? or who should be in charge arises. The struggles for leading operations or having 
control whenever there were issues among the ECOWAS states, was one clear example of 
what happened many years after the crisis in Liberia. These divisions and the struggle for 
heading institutions, assignments and missions, is a phenomenon that resides with most 
of the African institutions, the African union and other regional groupings. The question 
among them always is who takes the lead?
So, my summary is that, yes, there was some disagreement on that basis but at the 
end of the day, reason prevailed, decision was taken and decision was implemented, 
and we learned lessons from these things. So, what happened in Mali, many, many 
years after, was also about who should take the lead, who should be in charge, that 
is something that we also need to think about, when things happened, not just here in 
other regions, that is, usually in Africa for instance, there is usually some undercurrent 
of context between the African Union and the regional economic grouping, as to who 
should take the lead?21
It is evident, from the interview data generated; these differences generally were traceable 
from the roots, as having linkage with the seed of discord which the colonial masters planted 
in Africa, decades after the reign of colonial authorities in Africa. The cultural and language 
differences planted because of the partitioning of Africa and flinging to different colonial 
masters, the different parts of the continent to colonise, have left behind a very serious 
problem whose its consequences are costly to the entire continent and the West African 
sub-region specifically. 
ECOWAS, as a group, has three official “organisational or group languages”; English, 
French and Portuguese. The cultural attitude as well as the civil openness and maturity 
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differ in all the three cultures. These seem to play a greater role in shaping the attitude 
and behaviours of the states within the sub-region and the African continent. It also means 
therefore, that the relationship between the states in West Africa, will certainly have these 
elements of cultural differences arising from the different languages existing within the 
region. This refers to the dichotomy of the states in ECOWAS, in relation to the actions 
taken on the Liberian first crises (1990-1997), which led to the shift in ECOWAS’ stance 
on external interference and intervention, thereby abandoning the principles of non-
interference. It resurges the traditionally old ‘rivalry’ based on suspicion of hegemony by 
the francophones. The French states are not secured by the activities of the anglophone 
states, for Nigeria is West Africa’s presumed ‘hegemon’ (Akin, 2012).  If the moves by the 
anglophone states are genuine they might have come out of the desire to put things right. On 
the Liberian crisis and its subsequent ‘invasion’ by ECOWAS for instance, some scholars 
are of the view that Nigeria must get involved. Akin & Johnson posit that consequently, 
states like Nigeria were increasingly expected “to take charge of their neighbourhoods” 
and share the increasing problems of governance globally22; perhaps because of her relative 
strong economy, with a large military institution and the capacity to take charge of the 
situation in comparison to other states in the region.
Though one body with the aim of achieving a stronger economic union, ‘the generation’ 
of Liberian crisis and the way and manner the crises was handled by the member states of 
ECOWAS, got them divided rather than uniting it. The dimensions of the division clearly 
show that, rivalry and perhaps envy inherently exist in ECOWAS, and the most unfortunate 
aspect of the whole situation was staged because of the cultural identity and language 
differences. Max A. Sessay, mentioned the role of some member states in fuelling the crisis. 
He reports that:
There is evidence that Cote d’lvoire, Libya and Burkina Faso provided the training, 
money and weapons for Charles Taylor and his rebels. Libya provided most of the 
weapons, oil and money; Burkina Faso contributed men and training; and Ivory Coast 
was not only Charles Taylor’s major conduit for supplies and reinforcement, but also 
the country that prevented any discussion of the Liberian conflict in the Security 
Council in the first year23.
If some ECOWAS member states can aid in the organisation and execution of the rebellion 
within the ECOWAS community, then ECOWAS has a long way to crave for unity to 
serve a common purpose. Cote d’lvoire and Burkina Faso are ECOWAS member states. 
While they succeeded in contributing to the destabilisation of the community by aiding 
Charles Taylor with his insurgents to unleash mayhem in the state of Liberia, they also 
connived with other francophone states to frustrate a genuine effort to address the crises at 
the community level. They neither contributed much towards the peace process.
Three main issues are said to be the challenges or rather consequences of these dichotomy, 
which arose from the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention. Apart from institutionalising the 
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division of the community members further into two major camps on language differences, 
it has proven that it will be very difficult for the ECOWAS member states to have an 
institutionalised regionally-based military institution that can be used by the community 
with the same or uniform military training under a single unit of command. Additionally, 
if there are any ECOWAS military operations in the region, there will be divided loyalty 
based either on cultural affinity or language predisposition. Lastly, looking at the financial 
troubles the ECOMOG went through during its intervention in Liberia, ECOWAS will not 
be able to finance military operations with her mean financial resources without having the 
assistance and support of other international bodies, particularly the United Nations, the 
United States and the African Union.
This paper has established from both the literature as well as the responses from the 
interviews conducted that the division within ECOWAS is real and uncalled for. Though 
the division had been there since the period of colonial rule, and immediately after the 
post-independence African states, it was mild and latent, but got further amplified with the 
crisis in Liberia. Partly the division was formed by the language and cultural barriers, the 
influence of France and the lingering differences and orientation which the colonial masters 
bequeathed to the post-colonial African states.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, the decision to establish the economic group by the member states is 
a good one, for the development of the region. Although these states constitute enclaves 
of different colonial legacies with different political orientation, the benefits from the 
economic integration process will certainly trickle down to all the states and the entire 
ECOWAS community will benefit.
Colonialism was instrumental for the current behaviour of member states in ECOWAS. The 
erstwhile affiliation of subordination between the ECOWAS states and the former masters 
still lingers and affects the political, social, cultural and administrative orientation within 
the community. Nigeria is rich, powerful and resourceful, and therefore, is considered as 
a ‘threat’ to the existence of French interests in West Africa. France is still instrumental 
in dictating the policy direction of the French-speaking states in ECOWAS West Africa. 
France is envious of Nigeria, an anglophone state dominating and dictating the affairs of 
the sub-region.
Recommendation
There is a need by ECOWAS to revisit its treaty, examine the protocols and articles, with 
the view to updating them. Key issues that need revision are in the areas of cooperation and 
commitments of the member states towards goal attainment of its stated objectives.
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Nigeria should re-examine her external relations or foreign policy orientation with the view 
to re-defining her stance within the sub-region, particularly the “Africa-centred foreign 
policy pursuit’’ Additionally, the magnanimity extended by Nigeria to her neighbours have 
to be revisited.
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